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                                                            Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is twofold: to estimate the unrecorded economy (UE) 
of Turkey over the period 1987-2007 using a revised version of the currency demand 
approach and to analyze the relationship between UE and recorded GDP (gross 
domestic product). In particular, we propose to measure UE by the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration analysis. Toda- Yamamoto 
casuality tests are also conducted to identify the relationship between unrecorded 
and recorded GDP. This research provides fresh evidence on the size of the UE to 
the recorded GDP in Turkey which ranges from 10.65% to 18.91% over the 
estimation period. Moreover, empirical evidence concretely suggests that causality 
runs from the recorded GDP to the UE. However, there exists a mild reverse 
causality. Suggestions for economic policy and hints for further research are also 
offered. 
 
Keywords: Unrecorded economy, Currency demand approach, ARDL model, Economic 
Development, Turkey. 
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1.  Introduction 
The behavior of the unrecorded economy (UE) may be analyzed over the long and short runs. In the 
long run, it changes due to the trends in the relative costs and benefits of informality (e.g., level of 
development, tax burden, labor regulation, strength of monitoring, tax morale, etc.). In the short run, 
unrecorded Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reacts to the temporary conditions created by the business 
cycle and moves to close the gap that separates it from its equilibrium (Loayza and Rigolini, 2006). The 
goal of this paper is twofold. It develops a revised version of the currency demand approach to estimating 
the size of the UE of Turkey and, subsequently, we use the time-series variation to assess the causality 
from the recorded economy to the UE and vice versa. 
In this study, the term “unrecorded” (underground, unobserved, shadow, measured, informal, black, 
hidden, etc.) defines the economic activities to be included in the GDP but which, for one reason or 
another, are not covered in the statistical surveys or administrative records from which the national 
accounts are constructed (Blades and Roberts, 2002, p. 4). Although the issue of the UE has been 
investigated for a long time, the discussion regarding the ‘appropriate’ method by which to assess its 
scope has not yet reached a solution (Schneider, 2008). Methodologies of calculating the UE may be 
classified into three categories1: (a) direct, (b) indirect and (c) model-based. The “direct” methods are 
based on contacts with or observations of persons and/or firms to gather direct information about 
undeclared income. Two kinds of such methods exist: (a.1) the auditing of tax returns (e.g., Thomas, 
1992) and (a.2) the questionnaire surveys (e.g., Williams, 2006). The “indirect” methods try to determine 
the size of the UE by measuring the “traces” that it leaves in official statistics. They are often called 
“indicator” approaches and use mainly macroeconomic data. We distinguish among three sub-categories 
of indirect methods: (b.1) approaches based on national accounts (e.g., discrepancy between income and 
expenditure, discrepancy between official and actual employment); (b.2) monetary approaches; and (b.3) 
physical input methods (e.g., Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). Finally, (c) the “Model” approach (or 
MIMIC method) is based on the statistical theory of latent variables (Structural Equation Modeling), 
which considers several causes and several indicators of the UE (e.g., Dell’Anno, 2007).  
With reference to the “indirect” monetary approach followed in this paper, the currency demand 
approach, which is based on Cagan’s (1958) currency demand model, is applied. Tanzi (1980) initially 
utilized this approach to estimate the size of the USA’s underground economy. This method requires 
econometric estimation of the currency demand models twice: once with a tax variable and once without 
it. The tax burden is assumed to be the major reason for holding cash. The difference is referred to as the 
size of the UE. 
Recent literature reviews on the UE in Turkey have been provided by Schneider and Savaşan (2007) 
and Karanfil (2008). According to these analyses, it is clear that researchers have obtained widely 
divergent estimates of the size of Turkey’s UE. Table 1 summarizes some of these estimates.  
                                                 
1 For a fuller treatment of the several techniques that have been developed to estimate the UE, we refer to, inter alia, 
Cowell (1990), Thomas (1992), Pedersen (1998), Eilat and Zinnes (2000), Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Giles 
and Tedds (2002), Schneider (2005). 
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Table 1: The size of the Unrecorded Economy in Turkey (various studies) 
Authors Approach Period Size of UE (min-max) 
Kasnakoğlu (1993) currency ratio currency demand 
1968-1990 
1963-1990 
4% - 35% of official GDP 
0% - 23% of official GDP 
Temel et al. (1994) 
transaction approach 
currency ratio 
currency demand 
Tax auditing 
discrepancy method 
1970-1992 
1970-1992 
1975-1992 
1984-1991 
1987-1992 
0% - 26% of official GDP 
0% - 26% of official GDP 
6% - 20% of official GDP 
8% - 92% of official GDP 
1% - 4% of official GDP 
Yayla (1995) 
transaction approach  
currency ratio 
currency demand 
1968-1993 
0% - 62% of official GDP 
 4% - 100% of official GDP 
0% - 42% of official GDP 
Halicioglu (1999) currency ratio 1970-1997 0% - 10 of official GNP 
Ogunc and Yilmaz (2000) 
currency ratio 
currency demand 
discrepancy method 
1980-1988 
1971-1999 
1987-1999 
0% - 46% of official GNP 
11% - 22% of official GNP 
11% - 8% of official GNP 
Çetintaş and Vergil (2003) currency demand 1971-2000 17% - 31% of official GNP 
Us (2004) 
Physical Input 
currency ratio 
currency demand 
Tax auditing 
1978-2000 
1987-2003 
1987-2003 
1985-2002 
1% - 33% of official GDP 
0% - 90% of official GDP 
3% - 12% of official GDP 
26% - 184% of official GDP 
Savaşan (2003) MIMIC 1970-1998 10% - 45% of official GDP 
Karanfil and Ozkaya (2007) Environmental method 1973-2003 12% - 30% of official GDP 
Schneider and Savaşan (2007) MIMIC 1999-2005 32% - 35% of official GDP 
Davutyan (2008) expenditure-based approach 2005 21% of official GDP 
 
These results clearly indicate that the methods for estimating the size of the UE are still problematic. 
As Schneider and Enste (2000) stated, it is evidence that no approach is exempt from criticism, and 
further research is necessary to overcome several limitations. In particular, the proposed ARDL approach 
aims to overcome the criticism that the previous currency demand estimations of the UE are based on 
partial adjustment models. 
In the second part of paper, we present an analysis of the relationship between the UE and recorded 
GDP. The debate on the relationship between the UE and the recorded economy has attracted the 
attention of several researchers. Scholars have investigated the overall sign of the impact of the UE on 
economic performance, but they have often obtained controversial results (e.g., Giles et al., 2002; 
Dell’Anno, 2003, 2008; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004; Schneider, 2005; Galli and Kucera, 2003; 
Dreher et al., 2007). These outcomes led to the hypothesis that beneficial and damaging effects of the UE 
on the growth of official GDP coexist. 
A relevant contribution concerning which (negative or positive) effects of the UE prevail on official 
GDP was made by Schneider (2005). He estimated a quantitatively important influence of the UE on the 
growth of the official economy. Empirical evidence revealed a correlation between changes in these two 
phenomena according to the degree of economic development. In particular, Schneider (2005) found a 
negative correlation between the UE and the official economy for developing countries and a positive 
relationship for industrialized and transition countries. This outcome implies that the UE could be 
procyclical for developing economies and countercyclical for developed and transition countries. 
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In sum, this research differs from prior work in that it considers an application of the ARDL 
cointegration approach to estimate the currency demand function, with a view of obtaining a 
measurement of the UE in Turkey. Not surprisingly, this question assumes fundamental relevance for 
investigations of the interactions between official and unofficial GDP.  
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the empirical research 
analyzing the relationship between the official economy and UE. Section 3 describes the currency 
demand model and econometric methodology. Empirical outcomes are discussed in Section 4. The article 
ends with general conclusions.  
 
2. The relationship between unrecorded and recorded economy 
The relationship between the recorded economy and the UE has been investigated for a long time. 
Although the issue of the link between the UE and the formal economy is evident, the debate regarding 
whether the UE follows the formal economy through the cycle rather than vice versa is still ambiguous.  
According to Chen (2007), there are at least three schools of thought on the link between informal 
and formal economies: dualism, structuralism, and legalism. The “dualists” argue that unofficial activities 
have few linkages to the official economy but, rather, operate as a separate sector. This approach is based 
upon the neoclassical hypothesis that rigidities in the official sector, introduced through legislation or 
negotiation, segment the market (Harris and Todaro, 1970). The dualist hypothesis asserts that these two 
sectors are subsidiaries. Common factors lead to the flow of workers and activities from the formal to the 
informal economy. 
The “structuralists” consider the informal and formal sectors as intrinsically linked. Formal 
enterprises promote informal production and employment relationships with subordinated economic units 
and workers to reduce their input costs (Chen, 2007). Both informal enterprises and informal wage 
workers are inclined to meet the interests of increasing the competitiveness of regular firms by providing 
cheap goods and services (Moser, 1978; Portes et al., 1989). For this reason, a growing official economy 
boosts unofficial production. 
The “legalists” direct their interests on the relationship between informal activities and the formal 
regulatory environment. According to the legalist school, the UE comprises micro-entrepreneurs who 
choose to operate informally to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal registration (de Soto, 1989). 
These entrepreneurs will continue to produce informally as a response to unreasonable government rules 
and regulations. In this view, a growing formal economy boosts unofficial production if the regulatory 
framework is burdensome and government procedures costly. 
For Chen et al. (2004), previous schools of thinking regarding the informal economy are old-
fashioned. These authors suggest an integrated approach that looks at which elements of the dualist, 
legalist and structuralist schools of thought are most appropriate to which segments and contexts of the 
UE. 
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The literature on the UE over the business cycle has often concentrated on the analysis of informal 
employment (Bosch and Maloney, 2005, 2008; Loayza and Rigolini, 2006; Fiess et al. 2008). 
Unexpectedly, studies on the issue of causality between recorded and unrecorded GDP are relatively 
scarce.  
Looking exclusively at the empirical research on the beneficial or detrimental effect of the UE on 
economic development, Adam and Ginsburg (1985) estimated a positive relationship between the growth 
of the UE and the official economy under the assumption of low probability of enforcement. Lubell 
(1991) considered as significant the influence of the UE on the development of the official economy. 
Bhattacharyya (1999) shows clear evidence in the case of the United Kingdom (from 1960 to 1984) that 
the UE has a positive effect on several components of GDP (e.g., consumer expenditures, services, etc.). 
According to Asea (1996), the UE offers significant contributions “to the creation of markets, increase 
financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the legal, social, and economic institutions 
necessary for accumulation” (ibidem, p. 166). Enste (2003) argued that the UE stimulates economic 
development in transition countries. He considered the UE to be an incentive to develop both the 
entrepreneurial spirit and a constraint to limit excessive growth of government activities. Schneider 
(2003) emphasized that the UE, by stimulating competition, leads to more efficient resource allocation on 
both sides of the economy. Again, by assuming complementarities between the UE and the official GDP, 
Schneider (2005) claims that the unofficial activities, by boosting economic growth, are also able to 
generate additional tax revenues. Further empirical evidence of a positive correlation between the UE and 
the official economy have also been found by Giles (1999a, 1999b), Giles and Tedds (2002), Tedds 
(2005), Hametner and Schneider (2007), Dell’Anno (2008), Bovi and Dell’Anno (2009). 
The alternative hypothesis that the UE is countercyclical is mainly based upon the idea that unofficial 
activities, by creating unfair competition, interfere negatively with the market allocation.  
From the demand side, a lack of transparency may distort the information flows, thus hampering market 
competition and an efficient comparison of goods and services. From the production side, the untaxed 
return of investment of the unofficial business activities may attract resources from official firms because 
more productive investments of official activities may have lower taxed returns than unofficial ones. The 
misallocation then slows economic growth. Loayza (1996) found empirical evidence of a negative 
correlation between the size of the informal sector and the growth rate of the official real GDP per capita 
for 14 Latin American countries. The inverse relationship between the UE and economic growth is 
theoretically supported by the author’s hypothesis about the UE’s congestion effect. Loayza (1996) set 
out a model in which the production technology depends on tax-financed public services, the UE does not 
pay taxes, but must pay penalties, and these resources are not used to finance public services. According 
to these assumptions, a larger UE reduces the availability of public services to the official economy more 
than do the existing public services, which are being used less efficiently. Ihrig and Moe (2000) revealed 
that the changes in the size of the UE have an economically significant and negative effect on the growth 
of real GDP per worker. When examining the UE in 24 transition countries, Eilat and Zinnes (2000) 
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found an inverse relationship between the official economy and the UE. They estimated that a one-dollar 
fall in official GDP was associated with a 31 percent increase in the size of the UE. Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) observed that the UE mitigates the decrease in the official GDPs of transition countries. 
They estimated that for “every 10 percent cumulative decline in official GDP, the share of the irregular 
economy in the overall increases by almost 4 percent” (ibidem, p. 46). Schneider and Enste’s (2000) 
overall survey of 76 countries concluded that a growing UE has a negative impact on official GDP 
growth. Ihrig and Moe (2004) estimated a negative convex relationship between real GDP per worker and 
the percent of output produced in the informal sector. According to Chong and Gradstein’s (2007) 
findings, a large informal sector implies, inter alia, slower economic growth. Among the other scholars 
who have found a negative relationship between the UE and the official economy are Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984); de Soto (1989); Turnham et al. (1990); Thomas (1992); Johnson et al. (1998, 1999); 
Friedman et al. (2000); Ott (2002); Dell’Anno (2003, 2007); Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein (2005);  and 
Dell’Anno et al. (2007). 
As this survey has summarized, the literature presents contradictory results. A noteworthy contribution to 
reconciling these findings comes from Schneider’s (2005) research. He found that the effects of the UE 
on official economic growth are just prima facie ambiguous. The sign of the correlation becomes well 
defined if it is conditioned to the degree of economic development. He estimated a negative relationship 
between the UEs of low-income countries and their official rates of economic growth, but a positive 
relationship between the UE and economic growth in industrialized and transition countries. Schneider’s 
motivation was that the citizens of high-income countries are overburdened by taxes and regulation so 
that an increasing UE stimulated the official economy as the additional income earned in the UE was 
spent in the official sector. On the contrary, for low-income countries, an increasing UE “erodes the tax 
base, with the consequence of a lower provision of public infrastructure and basic public services with the 
final consequence of lower official economy” (Schneider, 2005, p. 613). Schneider (2005) stated that the 
effects of the UE on economic development should be evaluated by considering the beneficial effects of a 
smaller size of the UE in terms of tax revenue. In other words, discovery of a hidden tax base means 
additional resources for policy makers, thus leading to more resources for investment in productive public 
goods and services. From this viewpoint, if the policy maker lacks the resources to finance public 
investments (e.g., infrastructures, education, etc.), as in low-income countries, then a smaller UE makes 
possible the promotion of economic growth through finance policies. 
Finally, the issue of cyclical movement in the UE is addressed in a volume of literature concerning 
informal employment. For instance, according to Loayza and Rigolini (2006), in the short run, the 
informal sector is counter-cyclical for the majority of countries, with the degree of counter-cyclicality 
being lower in countries with more informal employment and better police and judicial services. 
However, Fiess et al. (2008) also showed that in numerous Latin American countries, informal 
employment behaves procyclically across some periods. Similarly, Bosch and Maloney (2008) found that 
in Brazil and Mexico, the “flows from formality into informality are not countercyclical, but, if anything, 
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pro-cyclical”. Gang and Gangopadhyay (1990) provided theoretical support for the hypothesis of the 
procyclicality of the UE. They investigated in a general equilibrium model the conditions under which the 
informal sector increases its capital stock more rapidly than the formal sector.  They concluded that the 
informal sector is often a dynamic actor in the process of economic development, frequently outpacing 
the growth of the formal sector. 
In the following, we aim to contribute to this debate by applying the Toda-Yamamoto causality tests. 
This econometric approach aims to determine the direction of causal influence between two variables 
(e.g., recorded and UE). Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a) and Giles and Tedds (2000) carried out similar 
causality tests for New Zealand and Canada, respectively. In both countries, they found significant 
evidence of Granger causality from the measured economy to the UE. They concluded that the UE 
follows the official economy through the cycle, rather than vice versa. For Turkey, this issue has been 
taken into account in one recent paper. Akalin and Kesikoğlu (2007) estimated the size of the unrecorded 
economy using a monetary ratio approach. Their Granger causality test results indicated the existence of 
one-way causality from the underground economy to economic growth. However, their results are flawed. 
They established that the variables of unrecorded and recorded GDP are integrated on the order of one. In 
spite of this fact, they implemented the Granger-causality test in the first differences of the variables, 
which makes the results misleading.  
Finally, this study aims to further extend the existing literature with an appropriate causality testing 
procedure. In the following paragraphs, we attempt to provide further evidence to solve the indeterminacy 
of the direction of causal influence between the UE and official GDP in Turkey. 
 
3. Model and econometric methodology 
 
3. 1 Model 
Following the empirical literature in demand for currency, we form the long-run relationship between 
currency demand, income, interest rates, foreign currency and tax burden in linear logarithmic form, with 
a view of estimating the size of the UE in Turkey as follows:  
 tttttt baearayaac ε+++++= 43210                              (1) 
where ct is real currency issued, yt is real income, rt is nominal interest rates on savings,  et  is  nominal 
exchange rates, bt is tax burden on businesses, and εt is the regression error term . The lower case letters 
in equation (1) demonstrate that all variables are in their natural logarithms. It is assumed that a rise in the 
tax burden variable will lead to an increase in the size of the unrecorded economic activities which 
requires a higher level of demand for currency. The expected signs for the parameters in equation (1) are 
as follow:  .0,0,0,0 4321 ><<> aaaa
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3.2 The bounds testing method 
The recent advances in econometric literature dictate that the long-run relation in equation (1) should 
incorporate the short-run dynamic adjustment process. It is possible to achieve this aim by expressing 
equation (1) in an error-correction model as suggested in Engle-Granger (1987). 
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where  represents change , Δ γ  is the speed of adjustment parameter and 1−tε  is the one period lagged 
error correction term, which is estimated from the residuals of equation (1). The Engle-Granger method 
requires all of the variables in equation (1) to be integrated of order one, I(1) and the error term is 
integrated to be order of zero, I(0) for establishing a cointegration relationship. If some variables in 
equation (1) are non-stationary, we may use a new cointegration method offered by Pesaran et al. (2001). 
This approach, also known as autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL), combines Engle-Granger (1987) 
two steps into one by replacing 1−tε  in equation (2) with its equivalent from equation (1). 1−tε  is 
substituted by linear combination of the lagged variables as in equation (3). 
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Equation (3) can be further transformed to accommodate the one period lagged error correction term (ECt-
1) as in equation (4): 
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A negative and statistically significant estimation of λ  not only represents the speed of adjustment but 
also provides an alternative means of supporting cointegration between the variables. Pesaran et al’s 
cointegration approach, also known as bounds testing, has certain econometric advantages in comparison 
to other single cointegration procedures, which are outlined in Bahmani-Oskooee and Tankui (2008).2
The bounds testing procedure is based on the Fisher (F) or Wald-statistics and is the first stage of the 
ARDL cointegration method. Accordingly, a joint significance test that implies no cointegration 
hypothesis, (H0: 0109876 ===== bbbbb ), against the alternative hypothesis, 
(H1: 0109876 ≠≠≠≠≠ bbbbb ) should be performed for equation (3). The F-test used for this 
procedure has a non-standard distribution. Narayan (2005) computes two sets of critical values for a given 
significance level with and without a time trend for small samples between 30 to 80 observations. One set 
assumes that all variables are I(0) and the other set assumes they are all I(1). If the computed F-statistic 
                                                 
2 Note that ECt-1 is formed using the long-run coefficient estimates from (3). For details see Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Tanku (2008). 
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exceeds the upper critical bounds value, then the H0 is rejected. If the F-statistic falls into the bounds then 
the test becomes inconclusive. Lastly, if the F-statistic is below the lower critical bounds value, it implies 
no cointegration.  
Equation (3) provides the short-run and long-run effects simultaneously after the adjustment is completed. 
The short-run effects between the dependent and independent variables are inferred by the size of b2i, b3i, 
b4i, and b5i. The long-run impacts are inferred by the estimates of b7, b8, b9, and b10 that are normalized on 
estimate of b6. Similar applications of the bounds testing approach have been employed by different 
empirical studies; see for example Narayan and Narayan (2005), Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2005), 
Narayan et al. (2007), and Mohamadi et al. (2008) 
3. 3 Causality 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality test is applied in level VARs irrespective of whether the variables 
are integrated, cointegrated, or not.  
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) argues that F-statistic used to test for traditional Granger causality may not 
be valid as the test does not have a standard distribution when the time series data integrated or 
cointegrated. 
The procedure applies a modified Wald test to carry out the restrictions on the parameters of the VAR (k) 
model. The test has an asymptotic (chi-square) distribution with k degrees of freedom in the limit 
when a VAR [k+d(max)] is estimated (where, d(max) is the optimal order of integration for the series in 
system). The test essentially involves two stages. The first stage determines the optimal lag length (k) and 
the maximum order of integration (d) of the variables in the system.  The lag length, k is obtained in the 
process of the VAR in levels among the variables in the system by using different lag length criterion 
such as AIC or SBC. The unit root testing procedure, such as Dickey-Fuller ADF (1981), may be used to 
identify the order of integration, d. 
2χ
The second stage uses the modified Wald procedure to test the VAR (k) model for causality. The optimal 
lag length is equal to p= [k+d(max)]. The VAR (k) models are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation technique. In the case of a bivariate (Y, X) relationship, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
causality test is represented as follows: 
t
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The null hypothesis that X does not cause Y is constructed as follows: . 0: 20 =icH
Similarly the second null hypothesis that Y does not cause X is formulated as follows: 0: 20 =ifH . 
The joint hypotheses are tested via modified Wald test. Different aspects and applications of causality 
testing procedures have been presented in many empirical research; see for example Papapetrou (2001), 
Love and Chandra (2005), Kalyoncu and Yucel (2006), and Valadkhani and Chancharat (2008).  
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4. Empirical results  
 
Annual data over the period 1987Q1-2007Q4 were used to estimate equation (3) via the Pesaran et al. 
(2001) procedure. Data definition and sources of data are cited in the Appendix.  
The time series properties of the variables in equation (1) were checked through Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) of Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root-testing procedures. The 
results are not displayed here due to space consideration. All of the series in equation (1) appear to 
contain a unit root in their levels but are stationary in their first differences except the income variable 
which is stationary in its level form. Therefore, it is appropriate to use the Pesaran et al. (2001) procedure. 
The visual inspection of the variables in the logarithm does not indicate structural breaks in time series. 
4.1 Tests for cointegration 
Equation (3) was estimated in two stages. In the first stage of the ARDL procedure, the long-run 
relationship of equation (1) was established in two steps. First, the order of lags on the first-differenced 
variables for equation (3) was obtained from unrestricted VAR by means of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Second, a bounds F-test was applied to equation 
(3) to establish a long-run relationship between the variables. To avoid a possible lag selection problem at 
this stage, one may follow the procedure of Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2003), which suggests 
applying some arbitrary lag lengths to test the sensitivity of the bounds F-testing procedure. The results of 
the bounds F testing are displayed in Table 2. The results demonstrate that when demand for currency is 
the dependent variable the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be accepted. Therefore, there exists 
a unique cointegration relationship between demand for currency and its determinants. 
Table 2. The results of F-test for cointegration 
Critical value bounds of the F statistic: intercept and no trend 
  90 % level 95% level 
s I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
4 2.30 3.22 2.68 3.69 
Calculated F- test statistics for different lag lengths 
 p=4 p=5 p=6 p=7 p=8 
),,,( berycF  1.30 1.65 2.63 3.85 3.55 
s stands for the number of regressors. p is the lag length. Critical values are obtained from 
Narayan (2005). 
 
4.2 ARDL model selection  
The ARDL cointegration procedure was implemented to estimate the parameters of equation (3) with the 
maximum order of lag set to 4 which was selected on the basis of the AIC.  In search of f the optimal 
length of the level variables of the short-run coefficients, several lag selection criteria such as 2R , AIC, 
SBC and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) were utilized at this stage. The short-run results of equation 
(3) based on several lag criteria are reported in Panel A of Table 3 along with their appropriate ARDL 
models.  The results from the model selection criteria of AIC and HQC are identical. The error correction 
term has the expected sign and statistically significant in all of the models indicating another confirmation 
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of the existence of the long-run relationship among the variables in equation (1). The long-run results of 
equation (3) are displayed in Panel B of Table 3. All the long-run models have the expected signs for the 
parameters. Moreover, the magnitudes of elasticities are very similar in the models of 2R , AIC and HQC. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 demonstrates the short-run diagnostic test results of equation (3). According 
to the revealed results, all of the short-run models pass a series of standard diagnostic tests such as serial 
correlation, functional form, and heteroskedasticity, except normality.   
The 2R  model appears to be more satisfactory in regard to long-run results and short-run diagnostic tests. 
Therefore, the results from this model will be used to estimate the size of the unrecorded economy. 
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Table 3. ARDL cointegration results 
Panel A: the short-run results 
Dependent variable  tcΔ
                                                  Model Selection Criterion  
Regressors 2R   
ARDL  
(3,1,2,0,0) 
AIC 
ARDL  
(3,1,0,0.0) 
SBC 
ARDL  
(3,0,0,0,0) 
HQC 
ARDL  
(3,1,0,0,0) 
1−Δ tc  -0.33 (3.26)* -0.38 (3.83)* -0.42 (4.22)* -0.38 (3.83)*
2−Δ tc  -0.02 (3.27)* -0.30 (3.17)* -0.38 (4.32)* -0.30 (3.17)*
tyΔ  0.25 (4.11)* 0.25 (4.05)* 0.24 (3.79)* 0.25 (4.05)*
trΔ  - 0.11 (1.78)** -0.11 (3.30)* -0.13 (3.57)* -0.11 (3.30)*
1−Δ tr  0.10 (0.67)       
teΔ  - 0.005 (0.36) -0.007 (0.59) -0.01 (1.06) -0.007 (0.59) 
tbΔ  0.09 (1.23) 0.21 (1.28) 0.04 (0.05) 0.21 (1.28) 
Constant 0.64 (1.04) 0.31 (0.94) -0.77 (0.33) 0.31 (0.94) 
1−tEC  - 0.24 (3.29)* - 0.19 (2.84)* - 0.22 (3.35)* - 0.19 (2.84)*
2R  0.48   0.47  0.45  0.47 
F-statistic 10.51*   11.43*  10.58*  11.43*
DW-statistic 2.05   2.01  1.87  2.01 
RSS 0.49   0.51  0.54  0.51 
Panel B: the  long-run results 
Dependent variable  tc
ty    0.54 (1.72)** 0.66 (1.52)** 1.07 (2.59)* 0.66 (1.52)**
tr  - 0.62 (4.57)* - 0.61 (3.51)* - 0.57 (3.95)* - 0.61 (3.51)*
te  - 0.01 (0.47) - 0.04 (0.61) - 0.06 (1.09) - 0.04 (0.61) 
t
Constant 
b  0.36 (1.54)** 1.09 (1.56)** 0.18 (1.05) 1.09 (1.56)**
2.56 (1.12) 1.64 (0.56) -0.77 (0.31) 1.64 (0.56) 
Panel C: the short-run diagnostic test statistics 
 2
SCχ (4)=5.29 2SCχ (1)=1.32 2SCχ (1)=0.36 
2
FCχ (1)=1.25 
2
Nχ (2)=129.5 
2
Hχ (1)=1.29 
2
FCχ (1)=0.82 2FCχ (1)=1.46 
2
Nχ (2)=7.29 2Nχ (2)=6.53 
2
Hχ (1)=0.34 
2
SCχ (1)=1.32 
2
FCχ (1)=0.82 
2
Nχ (2)=7.29 
2
Hχ (2)=0.40 2Hχ (1)=0.40 
* and ** indicate 5 % and 10 % significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. The absolute value 
of t-ratios is in parentheses. , , , and  are Lagrange multiplier statistics for tests of residual correlation, 
functional form mis-specification, non-normal errors and heteroskedasticity, respectively. These statistics are distributed as 
chi-squared variates with degrees of freedom in parentheses.  
2
SCχ 2FCχ 2Nχ 2Hχ
 
4.3 Estimating the size of the Turkish unrecorded economy 
 
This study will adopt the approach of Feige (1979) to measure the size of the UE in Turkey. This 
approach is based on Fisher’s (1911) quantity theory of money, which is expressed as follows: 
TPVM ×=×                                                                                                           (7)   
where M is money, V is velocity, P is price and T is total transactions. 
Another way of showing equation (7) is as follows: 
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GDPTPVDC =×=×× )(                                                                                       (8) 
where C is currency in circulation, D is deposits and GDP is income. 
This approach assumes that the velocity of money in the recorded economy and in the UE is the same.  
The estimated currency holdings are computed from the above regression equation with the tax burden 
variable. The same regression equation results are also employed to calculate the currency holdings as the 
tax burden variable is set equal to zero.  The difference between the estimated currency demand with and 
without the tax burden represents the amount of the illegal money is being held. The amount of legal 
money is measured by subtracting illegal money from the official narrow money stock M1, which 
includes currency in circulation (C) and deposits on demand (D). The estimated legal money stock is 
placed in equation (8) along with the actual level of the official GDP to compute the income-velocity of 
the legal money. Finally, the estimated income-velocity is multiplied by the illegal money holdings to 
obtain an estimate of the size of the UE.  The size of the UE as a percentage of the official GDP over the 
estimation period is depicted in Figure 1. The results are, by and large, in line with the previous empirical 
works. The size of the UE in 1987 is measured as 10.6 % of the official GDP, and then it reached its peak 
point in 2004 with a figure of 27.4 %. The size of the UE substantially contracted to 16.4 % of the official 
GDP in 2001 when the Turkish economy had a record negative growth rate. As of 2007, the size of the 
UE is estimated as 18.9% of the official GDP.  
The advances in electronic payment systems along with several effective directives issued by the Turkish 
Ministry of Finance seem to help in combating underground economic activities. The recent financial 
directives mandate that almost all of the salary and wages, rents, and direct and indirect taxes should be 
paid into banking systems. Private firms also intensively offer several financial incentives to their 
consumers to use their services to buy their products with different forms of electronic payments or cards, 
which reduce significantly the need for cash.  
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Figure 1. The size of the Turkish unrecorded economy as % of GDP 
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4.4 Results of causality 
 
To conduct a Toda-Yamamoto type causality test between the recorded (yt) and the unrecorded (xt) 
economies, equations (5) and (6) were employed. The integration properties of the variable xt are 
inspected through the usual unit root tests but are not displayed here either to conserve space. However, 
the variable xt is I(1). VAR (k) is determined on the basis of the AIC which suggests, k=5. The summary 
results of the Toda-Yamamoto causality test are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The results of the Toda -Yamamoto causality testa
 
Equation Null Hypotheses  p 2
7χ -statistic Decision b
Eq. (5) H0: xt does not cause yt 7 12.55 (0.084) Do not reject H0
Eq. (6) H0: yt does not cause xt 7 17.32 (0.015) Reject H0
a  p= [k+d(max)] stands for optimal lag length k=5, dmax=2. The probability values are reported in parentheses. 
b at 5% level of significance. 
 
According to the Toda-Yamamoto causality test results shown in Table 4, there is strong evidence of 
causality running from the recorded economy to the UE at the 5 percent level of significance. There is 
also noticeable evidence of the causality running from the UE to the recorded economy at the 10 percent 
level of significance. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that the causality is bi-directional. 
In term of economic implication, it suggests that the phenomenon of the UE exhibits a self-reinforcing 
mechanism which causes informality to persist. This “informality trap” (OECD, 2004) is more dangerous 
when the economy is in expensive phase. Hence, during a positive business cycle, it is clearly desirable 
for the government that the anti-UE controls be more effective. 
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 5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimated the size of the unrecorded economy in Turkey from 1987 to 2007 and 
investigated the long-run patterns and cyclical properties of the UE time series.  
This analysis is subject to a relevant limitation. It is extremely difficult to compute reliable UE estimates. 
The literature on methods of estimating the UE is still lacking a widely accepted theory. Measures of the 
UE, and particularly those based on monetary approaches, have been criticized on several accounts3, 
including their lack of robustness and weak theoretical foundations (e.g., the velocity of money in the 
recorded economy and in the UE is the same). To limit arbitrariness in measuring the UE, we suggest a 
further method based on ARDL models. The ARDL approach to estimating the size of the UE eliminates 
the criticism that the previous currency demand estimations are based on partial adjustment models 
(Ahumada et al., 2008). Therefore, our econometric selected cointegration methodology and causality test 
are an improvement over the existing studies. Furthermore, given their construction, these ARDL 
estimates are best considered in index form, rather than as absolute estimates seemingly comparable to 
official GDP calculations. The limited reliability of the UE estimates undermines the empirical 
assessments of theoretical statements on the effects of UE on recorded GDP and vice versa. 
On the positive side, the size of the UE in 1987 is measured as 10.7% of the official GDP, and then it 
reached its peak point in 2004 with a figure of 27.4%. In 2007, the size of the UE was estimated as 18.9% 
of the official GDP 
Empirical evidence concretely suggests that causality runs from the recorded GDP to the UE. However, 
there exists a mild reverse causality. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the UE is pro-cyclical with 
respect to the recorded GDP, supporting the hypothesis that the official and unofficial sectors are 
complements rather than substitutes. This result fits with Dell’Anno’s (2008) recent findings for Latin 
American countries.  
We conclude that the UE in Turkey thus sustains the growth of the official GDP because it mainly creates 
additional resources to reinvest in the economy.  
The pro-cyclicality of the UE has interesting economic policy implications. It suggests that the UE is 
increasing when the official economy is in expensive phases. Hence, government policies aimed at 
reducing the UE should mainly be carried out during a positive business cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Among the most recent research: Ahumada et al. (2007, 2008); Simanjuntak, (2008); etc. 
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Appendix - Data definition and sources 
 
All data are collected from International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Online Data Delivery System of  the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic (CBTR), Main Economic and 
Social Indicators of State Planning Organization of Turkey (SPO), and Annual Statistics the (Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TSI). 
 
c  is real currency in circulation in billions of Turkish Lira (TL), in logarithm. It is deflated by the 
consumer price index of Turkey (CPI=2000=100) of Turkey Sources:  CBTR, IMF.  
y  is  real gross domestic product in billions of TL, in logarithm. It is deflated by the CPI. Sources: IMF 
and CBTR.  
r is a weighted average of the interest rates on time demand deposits, in logarithm. Source: CBTR. 
e is nominal exchange rates between TL and USA dollar, in logarithm: Source: CBTR. 
b is tax burden of businesses which also includes the social security payments, in logarithm. Source: SPO 
and TSI. 
x is computed size of the unrecorded economy in billions of TL, in logarithm. Source: own calculation. 
M1 is narrow money supply in billions of TL. This data is used to compute the size of unrecorded 
economy. Source: CBTR. 
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